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Abstract
This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the decision to provide or buy
insurance against the risk of natural catastrophes. In contrast to conventional models of insurance,
the insurer has a non-zero probability of insolvency which depends on the distribution of the
risks, the premium rate, and the amount of capital in the company. When the insurer is insolvent,
each loss reduces the indemnity available to the victims, thus generating negative pecuniary
externalities. Our model shows that government-provided insurance will be more attractive in
terms of expected utility, as it allows these negative pecuniary externalities to be spread equally
among policyholders. However, when heterogeneous risks are introduced, a government program
may be less attractive in safer areas, which could yield inefficiency if insurance ratings are not
chosen appropriately.
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1. Introduction
Many scientists claim that both the frequency and strength of natural catastrophes such as
hurricanes, floods and droughts have increased over the past few years (see, e.g., IPCC, 2007).
Among other consequences, this growth could endanger the viability of the insurance and
reinsurance industry. Not only have global weather-related insurance losses from large events
escalated from a negligible level in the 1950s to an average of $9.2 billion per year in the 1990s
(Mills et al., 2001), but there have also been an increasing number of insolvencies: between
1969 and 1998, 36 US insurers became insolvent, primarily as a result of catastrophe losses.
Of these companies, 20 became insolvent between 1989 and 1993, the same time period as
Hurricane Hugo (Matthews, 1999). Between 2004 and 2011, 27 insurers became insolvent
after the series of hurricanes that devastated Florida in 2004 and 2005 (Florida TaxWatch
Research Institute, 2011). The present paper aims to investigate these failures by developing
a model of the natural-catastrophe insurance market, and evaluating the ways in which the
government can intervene. Two key issues will be addressed.
First, one common characteristic of public programs is that the government must strike
a balance between the goal of ensuring zero default risk and the demand for limited tax
exposure.1 The resulting debate generally revolves around one single question: Should
taxpayers have a preference for government intervention? On the one hand, with a purely
private market only policyholders at risk are faced with their insurer’s insolvency. On the
other hand, with a government program, policyholders participate in collective risk-sharing
via tax revenues. In both cases, when the insurer is insolvent, each loss generates a negative
pecuniary externality in terms of either a lower indemnity or higher taxes. To our knowledge,
no formal comparative analysis of these two alternatives has been undertaken. One reason
may be that a number of assumptions have to be relaxed if we wish to apply conventional
insurance models to natural disasters. In particular, natural risks are correlated, so that there
may be a considerable number of claims at the same time. As a result, an insurer can have a
non-zero probability of insolvency depending on (1) the distribution of the risks (Kunreuther,
2001), (2) the premium rate (Tapiero et al., 1986), and (3) the amount of capital in the company
(Cummins, 2006; Charpentier, 2007). The present article addresses this issue in an original
theoretical framework which takes all of these dimensions into account at the same time.
Another issue regarding natural disasters is the importance of risk diversification. Large
insurance companies can pool the risks with independent risks from other regions, which can
significantly reduce the probability of insolvency (Cummins, 2006; Charpentier, 2007). An
1 Examples of government intervention can be found in a number of countries (e.g. the US, France, Italy,
Spain, Switzerland, Japan, New Zealand, Canada, Finland and Norway). In the US, the federal government and
some States have developed programs for specific dangers. One example is the US flood-insurance program
which has faced large accumulated deficits, as exemplified by the $810 million deficit in the mid-1990s (Mills et
al., 2001; GAO, 2007). We can also cite the CEA earthquake-insurance program which receives no money from
the State budget, but does benefit from advantageous tax rules. In France, there is the “CatNat” system, where
private insurance companies have the possibility to buy reinsurance from a public-policy agency, the Caisse
Centrale de Réassurance. If it is not possible for this agency to pay for all the reinsured losses, it is protected
by government guarantee. This came about once, in 2000, for a total amount of 457 million Euros, due to severe
flooding in the South and the two storms in December 1999.
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insurance company can also purchase catastrophe reinsurance, which passes this risk on to
reinsurers. It remains to be seen, however, whether policyholders from less risky regions will
benefit from pooling with riskier regions. To address this issue, we extend our theoretical
framework by focusing on a simultaneous non-cooperative game combining two regions with
different natural risks.
We have two main results and policy implications. First, we show that the free market
does not necessarily provide the efficient level of natural-catastrophe insurance: insurance
with an unlimited guarantee from the government is shown to be a mean-preserving spread
of limited-liability insurance. In simple terms, government programs allow the negative
pecuniary externalities to be spread equally among policyholders; as such they are less risky
and more attractive in terms of expected utility. Risk-averse policyholders will therefore
accept to pay higher rates for unlimited-guarantee insurance, which will lead to a lower
probability of insolvency. Second, given the pecuniary externalities one region may impose
on another, we show that the viability of any government program depends strongly on the
correlation between and within the regional risks. In particular, government programs may
be more attractive to areas with highly-correlated risks, leading to inefficiency if insurance
ratings are not chosen appropriately.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 relates the main
assumptions of the article to those in the existing literature. Section 3 develops the one-
region model, and Section 4 extends the theoretical framework to a two-region economy.
Section 5 then statistically tests the robustness of the models, and Section 6 discusses the
policy implications. Last, Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review
Conventional models of insurance which deal with the problem of the rational purchase of
coverage, such as Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) model of adverse selection, do not apply
to natural risks for a number of reasons. The more recent literature has relaxed several
assumptions to better fit the reality of insurance markets. Among these, the following five
seem particularly important in the context of our analysis.
1. Natural risks invalidate the Law of Large Numbers. Standard insurance theories are
based on the fundamental theorem of probability known as the Law of Large Numbers. This
latter suggests that, given a sufficiently large number of policyholders who are independently
exposed to loss, the share of people claiming a loss should converge toward a predictable
average figure. This result no longer holds when we include natural catastrophes. Consider an
insurance company whose claims are partitioned into (1) independent claims due to isolated
events and (2) an accumulation of correlated claims due to natural disasters. Here it will be
relatively difficult for the insurance company to predict how many losses will occur within a
risk pool. A number of possible states of nature may pertain, depending on whether the natural
catastrophe occurs. For this reason, natural catastrophes are often considered as uninsurable
risks (Berliner, 1982). This idea of a range of possible states will be formally developed
below.
2. Natural risks imply a default risk. In practice, natural catastrophes may jeopardize
2
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not only the insurer’s solvency, but also financially threaten the policyholders whose claims
cannot be paid fully. Only few contributions have directly considered the effect of default
risk on the demand for and supply of insurance (see Tapiero et al., 1986; Doherty and Garven,
1986; Schlesinger and Schulenburg, 1987; Johnson and Stulz, 1987; Doherty and Schlesinger,
1990; Kousky and Cooke, 2012). The main idea in these models is to incorporate default
risk into the insurance-pricing decision and the expected utility of purchasers. Doherty and
Schlesinger (1990), for example, assume that the insurer will be solvent or insolvent with
some probability, conditional on the occurrence of a loss. Unfortunately, this insolvency
probability is assumed to be exogenous in the model, i.e. independent of the insurance premia
and the company’s capital. In Tapiero et al. (1986), the default risk depends on the premium,
but claims are driven by a Poisson process (as in standard actuarial models), which prevents
two or more claims being made at the same time. We here seek to fill these gaps by considering
endogenous insolvency probability in the context of correlated risks.
3. The natural-catastrophe insurance market is not perfectly competitive. When
risks are uncorrelated, the economic capital per policy required by an insurance company
approaches zero as the number of insured risks approaches infinity. This implies that
insurance companies become more competitive and propose lower premia as their number
of risks increases. Due to these increasing returns to scale, the insurance industry can be
either a natural monopoly (Emons, 2001) or a natural oligopoly (Cummins and Zi, 1998;
Sonnenholzner and Wambach, 2004; Chiappori et al., 2006). This is all the more true when
the losses are correlated. In that case, some amount of capital per policy is required even
as the number of risks approaches infinity (Cummins, 2006; Charpentier, 2007). Only large
companies can offer catastrophe coverage, because they have easier access to capital and can
pool the risk with independent risks from other regions.2 Our research here will thus also deal
with monopolistic behavior (i.e. price-making insurers), contrary to Rothschild and Stiglitz
(1976), for example, who focus only on competitive insurance markets.
4. Adverse-selection theories do not apply to natural risks. A number of authors have
recognized that Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) adverse-selection theory may not be suited to
the analysis of natural-catastrophe insurance. The reason is that information asymmetry could
be the other way around, so that insurers are better informed about catastrophe risks than are
individuals (Kunreuther, 1984; Jaffee and Russell, 1997). Insurance companies have access
to information using predictive and risk-spreading techniques to rate catastrophe exposure,
while individuals’ probabilities regarding high-loss/low-probability events may be distorted.
We will therefore not include theoretical aspects of adverse selection in the present analysis.
5. Moral hazard and time inconsistency. Government programs may create significant
moral-hazard problems by (1) discouraging individuals and local governments in regions at
risk from taking protective measures (Kunreuther, 2006; Goodspeed and Haughwout, 2012)
or (2) encouraging construction in hazard-prone areas (Kunreuther, 2006, Wildasin, 2008).
To some extent, these behaviors can be observed even when insurance is not available. For
instance, people will locate in risky areas if they consider that the government has a time-
2Consider the example of Florida, where 11 small insurance companies, with insufficient reserves and/or
reinsurance cover filed for bankruptcy the year that Hurricane Andrew struck, leaving the Florida State Guaranty
Fund to pay claims (The Congress of the United States, 2002).
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inconsistency problem, i.e. the government will likely bail people out after the occurrence of
a natural disaster. To solve these problems, some authors have advocated the use of well-
enforced building codes and land-use regulations to control development in hazard-prone
areas (Litan, 2005; Kunreuther, 2006). To simplify the analysis, the present research will
assume that such regulations are implemented, which allows us to consider an exogenous
distribution of catastrophic risks.
To sum up, our assumptions will depart from the existing literature in multiple directions
(correlated risks, an endogenous probability of insolvency and monopolistic market structure).
These innovations will allow us to compare limited-liability insurance to a government
program with unlimited guarantee.
3. The one-region model
Consider a region with n inhabitants. This region is exposed to natural events that will cause
a loss l to N individuals. Following the idea that the Law of Large Numbers does not apply,
several states of nature can be observed (Feature 1 in the literature review above). The focus is
on the share of population claiming a loss, X = Nn , which is defined over the interval [0,1]. Two
elements determine the distribution of X : first, the probability p that each individual claim a
loss and, second, the correlation δ between the individual risks. The coefficient δ can be said
to determine the magnitude of natural catastrophes — reflecting the total number of people
who claim a loss at the same time — and in turn influences the chances that the insurance
industry become insolvent. The probability p represents the odds for each individual of being
one of the victims.
The probability of an event of size X is given by the following increasing continuous
distribution:
F = F(x|p,δ ) = F(x) =
∫ x
0
f (t)dt ∈ [0;1], (1)
with:
(i)
∫ 1
0 x f (x)dx = p, (ii)
∂F
∂ p < 0 ∀x ∈ [0;1], (iii) ∂ f∂ p > 0 ∀x > x∗,
(iv) ∂F∂δ < 0 ∀x > x∗, (v) ∂ f∂δ > 0 ∀x > x∗, (vi) d pdδ = 0,
(2)
where any x > x∗ characterizes an extreme event. Assumptions (i-vi) may be interpreted as
follows. (i) The chance that I claim a loss is directly related to the number N of losses in the
population. Consequently, the probability p is also the expectation of X . (ii and iv) The higher
the probability p and the correlation δ , the greater the occurrence of extreme events. (iii and
v) Heuristically, the probability of an event x increases with p and δ if x > x∗. (vi) A change
in δ has no effect on p. Section 5 proposes some intuitive illustrations of such a distribution
function.3
3A simple way of understanding these concepts is to consider a nationwide coin-flipping game. Let X denote
the share of tails in the economy. If all inhabitants play with their own coin, the probability of getting tails
will be p = 50% for each individual, and we will expect an equal distribution of heads and tails in the economy
4
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By extreme events, we mean any event affecting a significant share of the population:
x larger than a given x∗. The value of x∗ is exogenous and is assumed to be determined by
the shape of the distribution function itself. In practice, extreme events are more likely to take
place when natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, floods or droughts) hit the economy. Natural
disasters provoke a great number of losses at the same time, which are highly correlated,
and increase the probability that an individual be a victim. There is thus a relationship
between x∗, p and δ . Extreme events are more likely to occur when the individual risk is
high (Assumptions ii and iii regarding p) or highly correlated (iv and v related to δ ).4
For simplicity of exposition, inhabitants are considered to be strictly identical with the
same preferences U = U(Y ), where Y denotes a negative random loss that depends on the
state of nature. The function U is assumed to be differentiable and increasing, with U(0) = 0.
The region’s inhabitants decide simultaneously whether to purchase full insurance coverage
so as to maximize their expected utility.
3.1. The supply of insurance
Insurance coverage is provided by a single company. Following Einav et al. (2010), we
take the characteristics of insurance contracts as given: only the contract price is determined
endogenously, not the coverage offered. We are interested in the per capita asset value of the
company α + c, where α denotes the premium inhabitants have to pay and c is shareholder
capital per policy (see, e.g., Zanjani, 2002 or Zhang, 2008 for similar treatments). The insurer
becomes insolvent when it is not possible to pay the full coverage l to victims, i.e. when
total losses (Nl) are greater than total revenue (nα) plus total economic capital (nc). The
probability of insolvency is given by:
P(Nl > nα+nc) = P
(
X >
α+ c
l
)
= 1−F (x¯) , (3)
where x¯ = (α + c)/l denotes the largest possible event without default. In comparison with
Doherty and Schlesinger (1990), this probability is not exogenous (Feature 2 in the literature
review). The greater the premium and capital per head, the higher is x¯ and the lower the
probability of insolvency. For a given value of c and α , this probability increases with δ .
Consequently, as in Cummins (2006), the amount of equity capital needed per risk to achieve
a given insolvency target increases with the covariance among risks.
The insurance company is assumed to choose the premium α so as to maximize
expected profit. Without insolvency, profit equals total revenue (nα) minus the total losses
(Assumption i). On the contrary, if they all bet on the toss of a single and unique coin, the nationwide outcome
will be either only tails or heads, while the individual probability of having tails will still be p = 50%. The
number of coins in such a game is an inverse proxy for how the risks are correlated. Whatever the number of
coins in the economy, we will always have p = 50% (Assumption vi). The occurrence of extreme events, e.g.,
x > 80%, rises as the number of coins falls (iv and v). If inhabitants play with loaded coins, e.g., p = 70%, we
will expect more tails (ii and iii).
4A larger correlation between risks should also be associated with more small events, i.e. ∂F∂δ > 0 for low
values of x. This assumption is however not necessary for our analysis.
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Table 1. Comparison of final payoffs.a
Individuals not claiming a loss Individuals claiming a loss
(with probability 1− p) (with probability p)
Insurance No insurance Insurance No Insurance
Limited liability −α 0 −α− l+ I(X) −l
Unlimited guarantee −α−T (X) 0 −α−T (X) −l
Zero probability of insolvency −α 0 −α −l
a Tax T is only paid if there is insufficient premium revenue to cover claims, i.e., when X > x¯.
Otherwise, T (X) and −l+ I(X) are equal to zero.
claimed by the insured (Nl = xnl). Profit here can be positive or negative depending on the
size of the losses. On the other hand, with insolvency, the company is assumed to distribute
the capital equally to the victims, so that profit is always negative and equals −cn. Expected
profits can be written as:
Π(c,α, p,δ ) =
∫ x¯
0
[nα− xnl] f (x)dx− [1−F (x¯)]cn. (4)
The company will provide insurance if and only if Π(c,α, p,δ ) > 0. It can be shown
that greater economic capital (c) reduces expected profits (Π) (see Proposition 1). For a given
premium, the insurance company is better off without any capital as only total revenue (nα)
can be lost in that case. On the other hand, the higher is capital per head, the more the
shareholders are exposed to failure.
Profits Π rise with α . As such, maximizing expected profits with respect to α is
equivalent to minimizing the probability of insolvency (in Equation 3, greater α leads to
higher x¯ and lower 1−F(x¯)). We can therefore focus equivalently on a risk-neutral insurance
company which maximizes expected profits or a risk-averse company that minimizes the
probability of insolvency.
Proposition 1. From expected profits Π, we obtain the following comparative static
derivatives (for x¯ ∈ [0;1]):
∂Π
∂c
< 0,
∂Π
∂α
> 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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3.2. The demand for insurance
Inhabitants’ payoffs are set out in Table 1. These depend on whether insurance coverage
comes from an insurance company with limited liability or with an unlimited guarantee
from the government. Following Feature 5 in the literature review, we assume that implicit
regulations prevent moral-hazard and time-inconsistency problems, so that the distribution of
the risks is exogenous to the insurance decision.
The scenario with limited liability. The payoffs are determined by both the decision to
buy insurance and the probability of loss l. If an individual does not claim a loss, the payoff is
−α with insurance, and 0 without it. If an individual does suffer a loss, the payoff is−α− l+
I(X) with insurance and −l without, where I(X) represents the indemnity. Figure 1 provides
an illustration. If the insurer is not insolvent (X ≤ x¯), the indemnity fully covers the loss, i.e.
I(X) = l. In contrast, in the case of insolvency (X > x¯), the indemnity received by each victim
is equal to the total economic capital (nc) plus the company’s revenue (nα), divided by the
number of policyholders claiming a loss, i.e., I(X) = c+αX < l. Each loss reduces the amount
of the indemnity available, thus generating a negative pecuniary externality for the victims.
The expected utility of a policyholder can be written as:
V (c,α, p,δ ) =
∫ 1
0
xU(−α− l+ I(x)) f (x)dx+
∫ 1
0
(1− x)U(−α) f (x)dx, (5)
where the first integral represents expected utility conditional on the probability x of being
one of the victims. In this case, the risk of a reduced coverage, i.e. −l+ I(x), has to be taken
into account. The second integral represents expected utility conditional on the probability
(1− x) of no loss. Given the properties of F (Equation 2), this integral equals (1− p)U(−α),
i.e. a policyholder will lose only α with a probability 1− p.
The scenario with an unlimited guarantee. In the case of insolvency (X > x¯), the
government will ask all policyholders to pay an additional tax T (X) in order to cover the
payment default, i.e. T (X) = X [l− I(X)] = Xl−α − c. Each loss increases the tax, thus
generating a negative pecuniary externality not only for the victims, but also for all of the
other policyholders. Compared to the limited-liability scenario, this negative externality will
be lower for the victims. If the insurer is not insolvent (X ≤ x¯), policyholders will not pay any
tax, i.e. T (X) = 0. Figure 1 provides an illustration. The final payoff is always −α−T (X),
and expected utility becomes:
V (c,α, p,δ ) =
∫ 1
0
U(−α−T (x)) f (x)dx. (6)
For comparison purposes, standard insurance theory presupposes a zero probability
of insolvency, which avoids any problem of negative externalities. In our setting, this
corresponds to the situation where I(X) always covers the loss l. In this case, policyholder
expected utility is pU(−α)+(1− p)U(−α), which is necessarily higher than V (c,α, p,δ ) in
Equations 5 and 6 (see the third row of Table 1 for a comparison of the payoffs). The presence
of default risk is thus detrimental to policyholders.
Formally, it can be shown that a fall in c and a rise in δ and p will reduce V (see
7
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Proposition 2). In addition, the premium has a negative impact on V , with one exception,
however, in the limited-liability scenario: if U is concave (i.e., inhabitants are risk-averse),
an inflection point may exist with low α and a high probability of insolvency (x¯ < xˆ, where xˆ
denotes the inflection point). In this case, policyholders will benefit from a higher premium
since this will significantly reduce the probability of insolvency.
Proposition 2. From the expected utilities V , the one-region model leads to the following
comparative-static derivatives:
Both scenarios:
∂V
∂c
> 0 for x¯ ∈ [0;1], ∂V
∂δ
< 0 and
∂V
∂ p
< 0 for x¯ > x∗,
Limited liability:
∂V
∂α
≶ 0 for x¯≷ xˆ, if U concave,
Unlimited guarantee:
∂V
∂α
< 0 for x¯ ∈ [0;1].
Proof. See the Appendix.
To simplify the analysis, we will only consider symmetric equilibria. Without insurance,
expected utility is pU(−l)+(1− p)U(0) = pU(−l). Individuals consequently buy insurance
if and only if V (c,α, p,δ )≥ pU(−l).
Due to the nature of the problem, relaxing symmetry is not straightforward. For
instance, say that a group of m agents have bought insurance. The decision of another
individual to join this group will depend on the expected indemnity I. The complexity comes
from the fact that the expectation of I is no longer a function of F(X), but will rather depend
on the distribution of risks in the group. This makes the model much more complicated with,
8
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to an extent, a structure identical to that in the two-region model presented in Section 4 (one
region for the m insured agents and another for the other n−m agents), but with a larger set
of distribution functions. Despite this difficulty, it should be stressed that increasing the size
of the risk pool is a traditional approach to insurance financing, even for natural catastrophes
(see Cummins, 2006 and Appendix A.8). Put simply, the insurance industry benefits from
positive externalities. In the same region, if an individual is better off by joining a group of m
insured agents, this would also apply to the other (identical) individuals since the probability
of default will be lower. We therefore expect only two possible outcomes: “no-one is insured”
or “everyone is insured”.
Assuming positive externalities is not sufficient to guarantee a unique Nash equilibrium.
When no-one is insured, there is no incentive for a single agent to buy insurance coverage
since he/she would pay a premium without reducing his/her risk. In other words, the
concept of Nash equilibrium is not suitable. Individuals can become stuck in a non-optimal
equilibrium where insurance does not exist even though it is the best solution. To overcome
this issue, we appeal to the concept of strong Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. A strong
Nash equilibrium is immune to any group deviation and, as such, is a much stronger concept
than Nash equilibrium (Konishi et al., 1997). When positive externalities are at play, it is
actually possible to show that a strong Nash Equilibrium exists, and is unique and symmetric
(see Appendix A.9). For this reason, when we refer to equilibrium below, we will be assuming
that it is a strong Nash equilibrium.5
Let α∗ denote the maximum premium individuals are willing to pay for an insurance
contract, such that V = pU(−l). It can be shown that α∗ increases with capital (c) and falls
with the correlation (δ ) (see Proposition 3). The reason is that a rise in c and a fall in δ
reduce the probability of insolvency (from Equations 2 and 3) and increase expected utility V
(Proposition 2). This result is consistent with Tapiero et al. (1986), who also find a negative
relationship between default risk and the premium policyholders are willing to pay.
Proposition 3. From the willingness to pay α∗, the one-region model yields the following
comparative-static derivatives:
∂α∗
∂c
> 0 for x¯ ∈ [0;1], ∂α
∗
∂δ
< 0 for x¯ > x∗.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the difference between the scenarios comes from the expected utility V
(Equations 5 and 6). Consider a given value of X , say x. Under limited liability, a policyholder
will have an x percent chance of being a victim with a payoff of Y = −α − l + I(x), and
a (1− x) percent chance of receiving Y = −α . Let A = {−α − l + I(x),x;−α,1− x}
denote this lottery. With unlimited guarantees, policyholders will always receive a payoff
of Y = −α − T (x). This lottery can be defined as B = {−α − T (x),1}. As A and B have
5Since we are dealing with symmetric equilibria, the decision to buy insurance is the same for all individuals
in the region. Consequently, tax T can be applied indifferently to “taxpayers” or “policyholders”. For the sake
of simplicity, we refer to our agents as “policyholders”. In practice, however, policyholders could leave the
program. This is why ex-post taxes are traditionally applied to taxpayers.
9
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the same mean, A can be said to be the mean-preserving spread of B. As a result, B will be
preferred by all expected utility maximizers who have a concave utility function (Rothschild
and Stiglitz, 1970). Note that V is derived from a combination of A, or B, and a third lottery f .
From the Independence Axiom of the von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theory,
preference over A and B will be unaffected by f . Policyholders are hence better off under
government intervention, implying that their willingness to pay will be higher, as shown in
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. Ceteris paribus, expected utility V is higher in the unlimited-guarantee
scenario if policyholders are risk-averse. Hence, the unlimited-guarantee scenario yields
a greater willingness to pay (α∗) than the limited-liability scenario.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.3. Market equilibria
We first consider non perfectly-competitive markets (Feature 3 in the literature review). If the
company is a price-maker, the equilibrium will be characterized by a premium such that (1) the
insurance company offers catastrophe coverage to maximize expected profit (or equivalently
to minimize the probability of insolvency), and (2) inhabitants choose insurance to maximize
their expected utility.
As ∂Π/∂α > 0 (from Proposition 1), the insurance company will choose the highest
possible premium such that inhabitants buy insurance, i.e., such that V ≥ pU(−l), subject
to the constraint that Π ≥ 0. In other words, the insurer will set the premium equal to the
policyholders’ willingness to pay, α∗. The outcome in terms of expected utility will be the
same in both scenarios: each individual will obtain utility of pU(−l), both with and without
insurance coverage. Given Proposition 4, if inhabitants are risk-averse, the insurer will be
better off with an unlimited guarantee from the government.
What is the impact of δ and c in this case? Regarding δ , a fall in the correlation
will generate higher expected utility (from Proposition 2), which will allow the company to
increase the price of the contract (Proposition 3) and yield higher expected profits (Proposition
1). The impact of capital c is more ambiguous. Higher c will lead to greater shareholder
exposure to industry failure (Proposition 1). It will also lead to higher policyholder willingness
to pay (Proposition 3) and generate an indirect increase in expected profits via the premium
(∂Π/∂α > 0 in Proposition 1). A company’s decision to provide insurance coverage for
natural risks therefore depends on both the capital requirements and the sensitivity of demand
to insurers’ financial strength. With inelastic demand, insurance companies will be better off
without any capital requirements. On the contrary, with elastic demand a large company may
earn higher expected profits as capital increases.
Our results can be easily extended to a price-taking insurance company. The optimal
choice from the point of view of policyholders is that with the lowest premium, so that
expected utility V is maximized subject to the constraint that the industry faces positive
expected profits (or an insolvency probability which is sufficiently low in the case of a risk-
averse company). This optimum can be reached via either market regulation (if policy-makers
10
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Table 2. Pecuniary externalities in the two-region model.a
Region 1 Region 2 Probability Indemnity in the case Additional tax in the case of
of insolvency of insolvency: I(X) insolvency T (X) = X [l− I(X)]
Insurance Insurance 1−F0 (x¯0) n1(c+α1)+n2(c+α2)N0 X0l−
n1(c+α1)+n2(c+α2)
n0
Insurance No insurance 1−F1 (x¯1) c+α1X1 X1l− c−α1
No insurance Insurance 1−F2 (x¯2) c+α2X2 X2l− c−α2
No insurance No insurance 0 0 0
a with x¯0 =
n1(c+α1)+n2(c+α2)
(n1+n2)l
, x¯1 =
c+p1
l and x¯2 =
c+α2
l .
have sufficient information) or the market itself (if it is sufficiently competitive). Either way,
policyholders will be better off with (1) government intervention (if inhabitants are risk-
averse), (2) higher capital requirements (if demand is sensitive to insurers’ financial-strength)
and (3) a lower correlation between risks.
4. Extension to a two-region economy
4.1. A new theoretical framework
Consider now an economy composed of two populations n1 and n2 living in two different
jurisdictions, denoted by Region 1 and 2, respectively. Each region is exposed to natural
events which cause losses of l to Ni inhabitants in Region i, i = 1,2. We are interested in the
stochastic process (X1,X2), with Xi = Ni/ni ∈ [0;1]. The share of people claiming a loss in
the total population is denoted by X0 = N1+N2n1+n2 . The states of nature are based on the following
probability distributions:
X1 ∼ F1(x1|p,δ1) = F1(x1), (7)
X2 ∼ F2(x2|p,δ2) = F2(x2), (8)
X0 ∼ F0(x0|F1,F2,θ) = F0(x0|p,δ1,δ2,θ) = F0(x0), (9)
where F1 and F2, the distributions of risk in each region, are assumed to satisfy the properties
described in Equation 2. For simplicity, the probability p of claiming a loss is the same in both
regions. The correlation between the risks (hereafter referred to as the within-correlation), δ1
for Region 1 and δ2 for Region 2, are allowed to be different. Function F0, the distribution of
risk in the whole economy, is directly derived from F1 and F2. This distribution depends on a
new parameter, the between-correlation (θ ), which defines how risks are correlated between
regions. We assume:
(i) ∂F0∂ p < 0 ∀x ∈ [0;1], (ii) ∂ f0∂ p > 0 ∀x > x∗ (iii) ∂F0∂δi < 0 ∀x > x∗,
(iv) ∂ f0∂δi > 0 ∀x > x∗, (v)
∂F0
∂θ < 0 ∀x > x∗, (vi) ∂ f0∂θ > 0 ∀x > x∗,
(10)
11
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Region 2
Insure Do not insure
Region 1 Insure V1(c,α1,α2, p,δ1,δ2,θ),V2(c,α1,α2, p,δ1,δ2,θ) V1(c,α1, p,δ1), pU(−l)Do not insure pU(−l),V2(c,α2, p,δ2) pU(−l), pU(−l)
Table 3. Payoff matrix.
for i = 1,2. Assumptions (i-vi) may be interpreted as follows. (i, iii and v) The occurrence of
extreme events in the economy increases with p, δ1, δ2 and θ . (ii, iv and vi) Heuristically, the
probability of an event x increases with p, δ1, δ2 and θ if x > x∗.
There is no mobility between regions. Individuals only differ in their location and,
therefore, in their probability distributions (F1 or F2). The premia they pay are given by α1
and α2, respectively.
The model can be applied equally to insurance with limited liability or unlimited
guarantee. In the unlimited-guarantee case, the tax is paid only by those who bought
insurance. In other words, the expected utility functions are similar to those in the one-
region model (Equations 5 and 6). This implies that the limited-liability scenario remains
a mean-preserving spread of the unlimited-guarantee case. The question that arises, however,
is whether pooling regions is preferable to no pooling at all, and under which conditions.
Table 2 illustrates the problem. When all individuals in a region are insured, this influences
the probability of insolvency in the other region, as well as the indemnity received and the
additional tax. As a result, willingness to pay can be favorably or unfavorably affected by risk
pooling.
For the sake of simplicity, we will describe the model in terms of a two-representative-
person game. We refer to the players as Region 1 and Region 2. There are a number of reasons
for using representative agents. In particular, as discussed in Appendix A.8, the insurance
industry can exist only when a sufficient number of individuals buy insurance. We should
therefore be interested in coalitional deviations. This can be done in three ways. First, as in
Section 3, we can assume that positive externalities are in play in each region. In this case,
it is possible to show that the rows of Table 2 describe the only four possible strong Nash
equilibria (see Appendix A.10). Second, we can consider the equilibrium premia as resulting
from the insurers’ perceptions of the world. The insurance company may be assumed not
to provide insurance in one region if the number of contracts is insufficient to significantly
reduce the probability of insolvency. To illustrate, many insurers in the UK have refused to
take on new properties with a history of flooding or charge risk-adequate premia that many
potential customers will think to be too expensive (DEFRA, 2011). Third, we can view this
strategic game as an interaction between two consumer unions, or elected representatives,
which coordinate the actions of their agents. In any case, this leads us to consider strong Nash
equilibria only. The decision to buy insurance will be the same for all individuals in the same
region.
Each region has to decide simultaneously whether to buy insurance coverage. The set
of actions available in Regions 1 and 2 is denoted {Insure, Do not insure}. The final payoff
matrix is presented in Table 3. The first entry in each box is Region 1’s expected utility for the
12
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corresponding strategy profile; the second is that of Region 2. If Region j chooses not to take
out insurance, Region i’s expected utility will depend only on its own characteristics, as in the
one-region model. Region i will buy insurance if and only if Vi(c,αi, p,δi)≥ pU(−l). On the
contrary, if Region j chooses to buy insurance, Region i’s expected utility will depend on both
regions’ characteristics: Vi = Vi(c,α1,α2, p,δ1,δ2,θ). The correlations δ j and θ affect Vi as
the insolvency probability depends on F0. The premium α j affects Vi as it plays a role in the
insolvency probability, the indemnity and the tax (see Table 2).
Proposition 2 regarding the derivatives of V will still hold if only one region buys
insurance. The results can also be extended to the two-region case when both regions
buy insurance: we then find a negative relationship between V and each correlation (see
Proposition 5).
Proposition 5. When both regions decide to buy insurance, the two-region model leads to the
following comparative-static derivatives (for i = 1,2; i 6= j; and for x¯ > x∗):
∂Vi
∂δi
< 0,
∂Vi
∂δ j
< 0,
∂Vi
∂θ
< 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let α∗i denote the willingness to pay of Region i when only Region i chooses to insure.
In this case, the results are strictly identical to the one-region model (Proposition 3). By way
of contrast, if we denote by α∗∗1 and α
∗∗
2 the willingnesses to pay when both regions choose
to insure, we have:
Proposition 6. When both regions decide to purchase insurance, the two-region model of
natural-catastrophe insurance leads to the following comparative-static derivatives (for i =
1,2 and j 6= i):
For x¯ ∈ [0;1] : ∂Vi
∂α j
> 0,
∂α∗∗i
∂α j
> 0.
For x¯ > x∗ :
∂α∗∗i
∂δi
< 0,
∂α∗∗i
∂δ j
< 0,
∂α∗∗i
∂θ
< 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 2 provides an illustration of Proposition 6. The left-hand panel displays the case
where Region j decides not to buy insurance: only the premium αi matters for Region i’s
decision to insure. On the contrary, the right-hand panel shows the case where Region j
decides to buy insurance. The higher the premium in Region j, the lower the probability of
insolvency, and the higher the expected utility of Region i. As a result, Region i is willing to
pay a higher rate if Region j also pays a higher rate.
4.2. (Strong) Nash equilibria
The set of (strong) Nash equilibria can be obtained by mixing together the bottom-left and
bottom-right panels of Figure 2. Figure 3 illustrates. The dotted line represents the 45-degree
13
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line where the premia in Region 1 and Region 2 are identical. The black lines depict the
willingness to pay when only one region is insured, i.e., α∗1 and α
∗
2 . Above the α
∗
2 -lines,
Region 2 will not buy insurance, and neither will Region 1 to the right of the α∗1 -lines. In
other words, the intersection point P between the black lines represents the willingness to pay
when the regions accept insurance via two separate programs.
The grey curves represent the willingness to pay when both regions are insured, i.e., α∗∗1
and α∗∗2 . Above the α
∗∗
2 -curves, Region 2 will not busy insurance, neither will Region 1 to the
right of the α∗∗1 -curves. These curves are upward-sloping in the other region’s premium from
Proposition 6. The intersection point Q between the grey curves represents the willingness to
pay when the regions accept insurance via the same program.
Consider a value of θ such that Points P and Q are the same. This starting situation is
represented in Panel a of Figure 3, where the regions are assumed to be strictly identical. As
a result of this symmetry, the intersection points are both on the 45-degree line and α∗∗i (0)
is lower than α∗i , i = 1,2. From Proposition 6, a fall in θ yields a higher willingness to pay
α∗∗i . As a result, Point Q moves to the North-East of Point P, and the regions’ willingness to
buy insurance will be greater when risks are pooled (see Panel b). On the other hand, as the
between-correlation increases, pooling risks will lead to a lower willingness to pay: Point Q
will move to the South-West of Point P (see Panel c).
Panel d displays an asymmetric case where only Region 1 faces an increase in the
within-correlation, i.e. δ1 increases. From Proposition 3, Point P moves to the West as we
have ∂α∗/∂δ < 0 in the one-region model. On the other hand, Point Q moves to the South-
West as both Regions 1 and 2 are affected by the change in δ1 (Proposition 6). When both
regions are insured, the players have the same expected utility function. Their willingnesses
to pay are necessarily equal, which implies that Point Q will remain on the 45-degree line. As
a result, Region 1’s willingness to pay for insurance is higher with pooled risks, which is not
the case for Region 2.
The two-region model underlines the important role of the between-correlation in
insurance. In panel c, willingness to pay is lower when the regions are pooled together. This
is because the between-correlation is sufficiently high to increase the default risk and lower
the benefit from insurance. In the asymmetric case, a common program may be less attractive
to safer regions. The importance of these results should not be understated. In January,
2011, a United States Representative from the State of Michigan, Candice Miller, proposed
legislation aiming to end the government-run flood insurance program (H.R. 435, National
Flood Insurance Program Termination Act of 2010). This bill was re-introduced as H.R. 1194
on March 14, 2013. She points out that participants in some States, such as Michigan, have to
pay for and cover the costs incurred in some other States. In our model, this problem can be
resolved by proposing a price that truly reflects regional within-correlation, and not only the
expected loss as is usually the case.
For instance, in Panel d, pooling the risks from the starting Point P without changing the
premia has the following consequences. On the one hand, Region 1 will accept this pooling
as α∗∗1 is higher than α
∗
1 ; however, Region 2 will be worse off since α
∗∗
2 is lower than α
∗
2 . In
other words, Region 1 will experience a gain in utility over the reversion level pU(−l), which
is not the case for Region 2. As such, at Point P both regions cannot choose insurance. The
15
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only way to achieve pooling is by reducing the premium in Region 2.
5. Robustness analysis
The present section tests the robustness of our theoretical framework via statistical modeling.
There are two main techniques to incorporate correlation in a non-Gaussian context, both of
which imply mixture models, i.e. probabilistic models based on several randomly-chosen
distributions (see, e.g., Denuit et al., 2005). The first technique consists in using a discrete
common-shock model, with a dichotomous variable describing the catastrophe occurrence.
The second focuses on a frailty-type model, with a continuous variable describing the intensity
of the catastrophe. We here use the first approach, which allows us to derive much simpler
results. To our knowledge, common-shock models have never been used in the context of
natural catastrophes and, as such, the following Sections are an innovative way of investigating
the theoretical models in Sections 3 and 4.
5.1. Modeling within-correlations
In the one-region model, the distribution function of N (or equivalently X) can be defined as
a mixture model depending on three probabilities:
• p∗=P(Cat)∈ [0;1] is the probability of a natural catastrophe, with 1− p∗=P(No Cat).
• pN ∈ [0;1] is the probability that an individual claim a loss in the case of no natural
catastrophe.
• pC ∈ [0;1] is the probability that an individual claim a loss in the case of a natural
catastrophe. We assume that pC ≥ pN , i.e. natural catastrophes increases risk
occurrence.
The individual probability of loss is given by:
p = pN(1− p∗)+ pC p∗. (11)
Conditional on the occurrence or not of a natural catastrophe, the risks between
individuals are assumed to be independent. For example, if p∗ = pN = pC = 10%, the
probability of loss is equal to p = 10%, and the distribution of N is simply given by the
binomial distributionB(n,10%). By way of contrast, if p∗ = 10%, pN = 0% and pC = 100%,
the loss probability is also p= 10% but the risks are highly correlated, since the probability of
claiming a loss is 1 in case of a catastrophe (i.e. we have a p∗ = 10% chance that everybody
claims a loss) and 0 otherwise (i.e. we have a 1− p∗ = 90% chance of no loss). More
generally, given Equation (11), the distribution function of N (and X) can be defined by the
following mixture of two binomial distributions:
F(x) = P(N ≤ k) = P(N ≤ k|No Cat)×P(No Cat)+P(N ≤ k|Cat)×P(Cat), (12)
=
k
∑
j=0
(
n
j
)[
(pN) j(1− pN)n− j(1− p∗)+(pC) j(1− pC)n− j p∗
]
, (13)
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where k = bnxc. To simplify, we can set:
pC =
1
1−δ pN , (14)
which allows us to write pN and pC as functions of p∗, p and δ (using Equations (11) and
(14)):
pN =
(1−δ )p
1−δ +δ p∗ , (15)
pC =
p
1−δ +δ p∗ . (16)
The coefficient δ ∈
[
0,min
{
1, 1−p1−p∗
}]
is crucial in our analysis, and can be seen as a proxy
for the within-correlation.
Proposition 7. The coefficient δ is an increasing monotonic function of the correlation
between the individual risks.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 4 provides an illustration of the cumulative distribution function F when n= 500,
p∗ = 0.1, p = 0.3, and δ = 0.4. In this case, the probabilities pN and pC are equal to 0.28
and 0.47 respectively. Using this statistical modeling, we can test our theoretical framework
and check the validity of the properties of F as described in Equation (2): (i) in the bottom-
panel of Figure 4, the individual probability p is also the expectation of X ; (ii) when the loss
probability p rises from 0.3 to 0.5 (see the top panel of Figure 5), the distribution function
shifts to the right, with pN = 0.47 and pC = 0.78; (iii and v) the probability of an extreme
event, for instance x = 0.8, increases with p and δ (see the bottom panel of Figures 5 and 6,
respectively); (iv) a rise in δ from 0.4 to 0.7 implies a fall in pN to 0.24, and a rise in pC to
0.81, so that when δ is high, there is either a small or an extreme event (see Figure 6); and
(vi) in Figure 6, a rise in δ has no effect on p. Note that our theoretical analysis concentrated
on the right-hand side of the distribution function, where x is greater than x∗ = pC.
Figure 7 illustrates the outcome with an infinite number of agents. With correlated risks
(the top panel of Figure 7), the cumulative distribution function F still has two bends, but
they are much sharper. Two possible states of nature can be observed depending on whether a
natural disaster occurs. The insurance company can set the premium so that x¯ is between pN
and pC. In this case, the company has a 10% chance of insolvency. The insurance company
can also set the premium so that x¯ is greater than pC, which will guarantee a zero insolvency
probability. With uncorrelated risks (the bottom panel of Figure 7), the function F has only
one bend, and the Law of Large Numbers holds. The insurer can set the premium so that x¯ is
greater than p = 0.30, which will guarantee a zero insolvency probability.
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Figure 4. Functions F and f (n = 500, p∗ =0.1, p = 0.3, δ = 0.4)
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Figure 5. Impact of an increase in p on F and f (p =0.3 then 0.5) .
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Figure 6. Impact of an increase in δ on F and f (δ =0.4 then 0.7).
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Table 4. Catastrophe probabilities in the two-region economy.
Cat in Region 1 No Cat in Region 1
Cat in Region 2 No Cat in Region 2 Cat in Region 2 No Cat in Region 2
General case θ p∗−θ p∗−θ 1−2p∗+θ
Perfectly independent (p∗)2 p∗(1− p∗) p∗(1− p∗) (1− p∗)(1− p∗)
Positively dependent p∗ 0 0 1− p∗
5.2. Modeling the between-correlations
Consider two regions with the same probability p∗ of a catastrophe. The probabilities pC
and pN may be different from one region to the other, and will be denoted by P1C , P
1
N , P
2
C , P
2
N
for Region 1 and Region 2, respectively. The distribution function F0 of natural events over
the whole economy can be derived from a mixture of the F1 and F2 observed in each region.
There are four possible cases, depending on whether the regions experience a catastrophe
or not. These possible cases are described in Table 4. Let pCC = θ denote the probability
that Regions 1 and 2 are both victims of a catastrophe, pCN = p∗− θ the probability that
only Region 1 is hit, pNC = p∗− θ when only Region 2 is hit, and pNN = 1− 2p∗+ θ the
probability that neither Region 1 nor 2 is hit. The probability density function of X0 can be
defined as:
f0(x) = pCC fCC(x)+ pCN fCN(x)+ pNC fNC(x)+ pNN fNN(x), (17)
with
fab(x) =B(n1, p1a)?B(n2, p
2
b), (18)
where a,b ∈ {C,N} and ? denotes the convolution operator. Here, pCC = θ represents the
between-correlation.
Figure 8 shows the case where the risks between the regions are perfectly independent,
i.e. θ = (p∗)2. The black lines represent the cumulative distribution function F1 (in the top
panel) and the density f1 in Region 1 (bottom panel) when p = 0.3, n1 = 500 and δ1 = 0.5.
The grey curves depict F0 and f0 when Region 1 is pooled with an identical region. In the
vicinity of x∗ = pC, we can see that F0 is above F1, i.e. pooling Region 1 with another region
reduces the probability of an extreme event. By way of contrast, when the risks are positively
correlated, i.e. when θ = p∗, F0 is below F1 in the vicinity of pC (see Figure 9). In this case,
pooling Region 1 with another region increases the probability of an extreme event. This
corresponds to properties (v) and (vi) of the two-region model (see Equation (10)).
In Figure 10, the risks between the regions are independent, i.e. θ = (p∗)2, but Region
1 has a lower within-correlation than Region 2 (δ1 = 0.5 and δ2 = 0.7). We can see that F0 is
below F1 around pC, so that pooling Region 1 with a riskier area will be detrimental to Region
1. On the other hand, pooling Region 1 with a safer area will be beneficial to Region 1 (see
Figure 11 where δ1 = 0.5 and δ2 = 0.3). This corresponds to properties (v) and (vi) of the
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Figure 8. F1 and F0 when the risks are perfectly independent.
two-region model (see Equation (10)).
5.3. Application to the one-region model
This subsection investigates the one-region model by simulations using the mixture model of
Subsection 5.1. Although we will not carry out the analysis here, the simulations can easily be
extended to the two-region model. For graphical convenience, the probability of a catastrophe
p∗ will be fixed at 0.05, while the loss will be set at l = 1, n to 1000, and the utility function to
U(Y )= 100(1−e−2Y ). This U function is concave (policyholders are risk-averse) and belongs
to the CARA class of utility functions, with a constant Arrow-Pratt measure of Absolute Risk
Aversion.
Figure 12 shows expected utility V as a function of the premium α for c= 0.05, δ = 0.9
and p = 0.1. The grey line represents expected utility without government intervention, and
the thin black line the unlimited-guarantee scenario. The thick black line shows expected
utility when there is a zero probability of insolvency, i.e. U(−α). Consistent with our
expectations, the thick black line is above the other curves and expected utility is higher with
unlimited guarantee than without.
The two dots on the right-hand side correspond to the willingness to pay (α∗). The
values are obtained for the highest possible premia such that inhabitants are indifferent
between V and pU(−l). These dots characterize the market equilibrium when the market
is not perfectly competitive. Expected utility is equal to pU(−l) =−63.9 in both cases, with
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Figure 9. F1 and F0 when the risks are positively dependent.
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Figure 10. F1 and F0 when Region 1 has a lower within-correlation.
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Figure 11. F1 and F0 when Region 1 has a higher within-correlation.
α∗ = 0.206 without government intervention and 0.216 with intervention. The two dots on
the left-hand side correspond to the lowest possible premia such that the expected profit of
the insurance company is non-negative. This situation could come about with a competitive
market or a regulated monopoly, for example.
As demonstrated in Proposition 2, under limited-liability insurance, expected utility
initially rises with the premium and then falls (see Figure 12, for instance). This result does
not hold with government intervention. This can easily be explained. Recall that insolvency
occurs when x >
(
x¯ = α+cl
)
. If α is small, the probability of insolvency is very high (almost
1), while the indemnity received by the policyholders is close to nc/N, i.e. very small. Without
government intervention, a rising premium will generate a greater indemnity and reduce the
probability of insolvency. As the probability of insolvency becomes insignificant, expected
utility will as usual fall with the premium. By way of contrast, with government intervention,
full coverage will always be guaranteed. An increase in the premium will then only serve the
interests of the insurance company.
Figures 13 and 14 provide an illustration of Propositions 2 and 3. In Figure 13, a fall in
the correlation from 0.9 to 0.8 has a positive effect on expected utility and willingness to pay;
similar results are found in Figure 14 for a rise in capital per head from c = 0.05 to 0.08. In
both figures, the lowest possible premia such that expected profit is still positive (the two dots
on the left) rise as shareholders will be more exposed to industry failure (Proposition 1).
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Table 5. A simple illustration of the problem.a
Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Regions 1+2 Regions 1+3
1. Loss per inhabitant in Year 1 5 65 35 35 20
2. Loss per inhabitant in Year 2 95 35 65 65 80
3. Average of annual losses 50 50 50 50 50
4. Variance of annual losses 2025 225 225 225 900
5. Pearson correlation coefficient -1 +1
a The number of inhabitants is the same in each region.
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6. Policy implications
The results we have obtained, both from the theoretical model under a set of assumptions
and the ad hoc statistical model, yield a better understanding of insurance markets with
natural catastrophes. The three main elements behind the occurrence of natural events were
the probability (p) that each individual claim a loss, the within-correlation (δ ) between the
individual risks, and the between-correlation (θ ), i.e. how risks are correlated between two
regions.
In practice, the model parameters can easily be approximated. For pedagogical reasons,
instead of focusing on a real-world case study, we prefer to consider a simpler illustration with
only two years of catastrophic losses (see Table 5). This approach will allow us to illustrate
several key concepts. In Table 5, the average of the losses (Row 3) is an approximation of the
level of risk, and as such reflects p in our model. While this level of risk is the same in each
region, the time profile of the losses (Rows 1 and 2) is different, thus affecting the probability
that the insurance industry become insolvent. The variance over time (Row 4) can actually be
considered as a proxy for δ : this variance is high in Region 1 as both a small and an extreme
event occur. By way of contrast, the losses per capita in Regions 2 and 3 converge toward
the average, so that there is only a low within-correlation. The between-correlation θ can be
approximated by the Pearson correlation coefficient (Row 5): the natural risks in Regions 1
are more correlated with those in Region 3 than they are with those in Region 2.
The within-correlation δ plays an important role in our theoretical framework. For
instance, in Table 5 an insurer will prefer to insure Regions 2 and 3 because these regions do
not face extreme events. Similarly, the willingness to pay for insurance will be higher in these
regions, as the insolvency probability is lower. In other words, insurance coverage is more
likely to be provided in Regions 2 and 3 than it is in Region 1. How can we solve the problem
of Region 1 in a Pareto-efficient manner? The present research suggests a number of solutions
within a unified microeconomic framework.
6.1. The role of capital resources
Policymakers have often chosen to intervene in the first place via capital requirements. In
our model, the willingness to pay for insurance rises with the company’s capital. This
presumes that potential clients are able to make rational decisions about low-probability, high-
consequence events, i.e. that they are not rationally bounded and concerned with solvency.
A number of US analyses have found that demand responds to the insurer’s financial-
strength rating (see for instance Sommer, 1996; Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Epermanis and
Harrington, 2006). As such, as in our model, greater capital requirements would benefit
potential buyers, and allow insurers to propose higher ratings. However, greater capital
will also increase the exposure of shareholders to industry failure, thus putting insurance
companies in a more uncomfortable position (see Subsection 3.3).
Capital-requirement regulation are not necessarily easy to implement in practice. The
decision to increase capital requirements actually depends on the sensitivity of demand to
insurers’ capital resources. Another possibility would be to reduce the cost of access to capital
itself, which will be beneficial on both the demand and supply sides. For instance, some
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authors have suggested the use of capital-market instruments such as CAT bonds or CAT
options to help insurance companies access capital in financial markets. Another suggestion
has been the creation of tax-deferred catastrophe reserves (Kousky, 2011).
6.2. A regulated premium
When faced with natural disasters, private insurers ask for high premia for many reasons. For
instance, higher premia protect businesses from financial ruin; the pre-funding of disasters is
better than post-funding; and when assessing the risk of a disaster is difficult, it is only rational
for the industry to charge high premia. Simply put, premia for catastrophic risks should be
higher than for non-catastrophic risks. We have shown that this assertion is true only from
the supply-side point of view. A higher premium will reduce the probability of insolvency
and lead to higher expected profits. However, from the demand-side, the willingness to pay
for catastrophe coverage falls with δ , as correlated risks imply a higher default risk (see
Subsection 3.2). For a same level of risk (p), catastrophe coverage that is sold at a price
higher than that of non-catastrophe coverage should be less attractive to potential buyers.
This problem is also discussed in Kousky and Cooke (2012). They argue that insurers
who insure correlated risks need to charge a price that is many times the expected loss in
order to satisfy their solvency constraint. On the contrary, homeowners, who face both a
budget constraint and the constraint that their utility with insurance exceeds that without, may
find the required loadings too high for insurance purchase to be optimal.
On top of those theoretical implications, the potential influence of politics on pricing
should be borne in mind. As an example, in the US, “States with a high-level of catastrophe
risk, such as Florida and California, have faced strong political pressure to enforce
extraordinary measures to constrain the price of catastrophe insurance” (Klein, 1998).
Given these controversial effects, it is difficult to imagine that a regulated price will be of
any use, unless the goal is to solve market inefficiencies resulting from imperfect competition
and imperfect information (see, e.g., Epple and Schäfer, 1996; Jaffee and Russell, 1997). For
instance, we have shown in Subsection 3.3 that a non perfectly-competitive market may lead
the industry to propose a price equal to policyholders’ willingness to pay, thus reducing their
benefit from insurance coverage to zero.
6.3. The importance of risk diversification
The natural-catastrophe insurance industry may be characterized by economies of scale if the
between-correlation (θ ) is sufficiently low (see Subsection 3.3). For instance, we can see from
the two last columns of Table 5 that an insurer would benefit from pooling Regions 1 and 2,
but not from pooling Regions 1 and 3.
The growth of private reinsurance coverage throughout the world in recent decades has
resulted in a much larger and more efficient geographical pooling of risk. In addition, a
number of countries have set up guarantee or solvency funds to protect policyholders in the
event that an insurer goes bankrupt. These guarantee funds are financed by the insurance
companies and work somewhat similarly to a reinsurance pool. However, contributions are
not based on insurer risks, which is often criticized. Our two-region model illustrates the
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problem: an insurer in a safer region will accept to pay the same contribution as the others if
and only if (1) the risk of default is sufficiently reduced and (2) demand is sufficiently sensitive
to insurers’ financial strength. If not, the introduction of guarantee funds would hurt less-risky
firms. Risk-based contributions also have the advantage of reducing the risk of moral hazard
by preventing insurers from adopting high-risk strategies (Cummins, 1988).
Despite the existence of reinsurance coverage and guarantee funds, many insurers still
refuse to provide coverage for overly-risky areas. This was the case in the US where insurers
did not provide flood-insurance coverage, as flood hazards were typically confined to a few
areas. Other examples can be found in Germany, where some people living in Baden-
Württemberg could not find insurance covering them against the periodically-recurring floods
(Epple and Schäfer, 1996). All these problems were solved by the creation of government
programs.
6.4. Unlimited guarantee from the government
Because it spreads the risks more equally among policyholders, government-provided
insurance will be more attractive to policyholders. This allows insurers to sell coverage at
higher prices, reducing the insolvency probability, lead to higher expected profits, and may
guarantee the existence of catastrophe coverage (see Subsections 3.2 and 3.3).
Consider, for instance, n= 100,000 taxpayers who bought insurance coverage. Suppose
that x= 1% of this population, i.e., N = 1,000 victims, will claim a loss of l = $100,000. The
total loss is then $100 million. Moreover, assume that the insurance industry is able to pay
maximum compensation of $80 million. With a limited-liability corporation, each claim will
generate large negative externalities: the 1,000 victims will receive a reduced indemnity of
I = $80 million1,000 = $80,000 and will thus lose I− l = $20,000. Since an agent has a x = 1%
likelihood of being one of the victims, the expected loss is 0.01×20,000+0.99×0 = $200.
On the contrary, if the government intervenes as an insurer of last resort, it does not matter
whether an agent claims a loss or not as all n taxpayers are supposed to finance the payment
default. Everyone will lose T = $20 million100,000 = $200. Under this unlimited-guarantee scenario,
each claim represents a negative pecuniary externality, not only for the victims, but also for
the rest of the population.
Comparing the two scenarios leads us to conclude that the limited-liability scenario is
a mean-preserving spread of the unlimited-guarantee case. If individuals are risk-averse, they
will prefer the unlimited-guarantee scenario. Of course, in practice, people do not know x
with certainty and face a larger number of possible states of nature. However, this result
was generalized in Section 3 using the Independence Axiom of von Neumann-Morgenstern
Expected Utility Theory.
To sum up, the advantage of a government program over the limited-liability case comes
from the possibility of ex-post budgeting, leading to less-risky lotteries. This comes about as
the private sector may face some difficulty in imposing participation or obtaining access to
credit once bankrupted. In practice, a government program can be financed by higher taxes
or borrowing. In any case, it should be stressed that the Barro-Ricardo equivalence theorem
may apply in our model, i.e., the timing of the loan should not affect the present value of the
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budget and, as such, our results would not change were we to include deficits.
6.5. A government program should be appropriately priced
While an unlimited guarantee may be an appropriate way of spreading risks, it does raise
other questions. To put our model in context it is useful to consider the US National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP). One frequently-asked question about NFIP is: “Will policyholders
in non-coastal states pay more for flood insurance to support losses along the coast?”. The
answer is that premia are based on risk, not location. Two housing units with the same risk (p
in our model) but located in areas with different potential damage (related to δ in our model)
— for example, one in a shallow floodplain and the other in a steep and narrow mountain
valley — will be charged the same rate (GAO, 2008). According to the two-region model
developed in Section 4, this pricing policy may be inefficient. For instance, in Table 5, a
government program that brings together Regions 1 and 3 cannot be politically viable in the
long run. The inhabitants of Region 3 would not understand why they should pay the same
price as those in Region 1. To be politically viable, the government program should propose
a lower fee to Region 3. In Klein (1998), additional examples are given in the context of
multi-State insurance which can also be related to the model’s conclusions.
The two-region model provides a useful normative tool for regulation. Given the
pecuniary externalities one region may impose on another, the insurance premia under a
government program should be based not only on the level of risk (p), i.e. on expected losses
(a basic actuarial principle), but also on how the risks are correlated between and within
regions (δ and θ ), i.e. on the variance of the losses (which has never been applied, to our
knowledge). In particular, government officials must be prepared to announce rates lower
than usual in order to attract safer regions.
Another important motivation for government intervention is the ability of the
government to force take-up across risk levels and then broaden the risk base across which
insurance is provided. In the two-region model, policyholders benefit from pooling with
independent risks from another region. This is all the more true if the covered damages are
different, e.g., earthquake vs. flood. This considerably reduces the between-correlation and
increases the willingness to pay for insurance coverage.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper has highlighted some key mechanisms connecting the premium rate, capital, risk
correlation, and the decision to provide or buy insurance. Given our results, it is not surprising
that so many industrialized nations have intervened in catastrophe-insurance markets, even
though the implemented programs have sometimes suffered from severe financial difficulties.
The probability of failure of a government program should be lower than that in a purely-
private market: risk-averse policyholders will accept to pay higher rates for unlimited-
guarantee insurance, thus reducing the probability of insolvency. To limit protests from
the less-correlated areas, these rates should be calculated based on how risks are correlated
between and within the jurisdictions involved.
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We suspect that the current research could also apply in other situations. For
example, insurance against terrorism, the provision of fire protection, health programs and
unemployment insurance, could be analysed in this light. Moreover, while the present
analysis has compared public and private programs from a normative point of view, it has
not, however, addressed all the political realities of government-insurance programs. We
could go further here by introducing self-interested government officials into the model. For
example, the government tax in our model is not risk-based — that is, it is paid equally by
all policyholders. There are thus distributional issues. As shown above, some of these can be
addressed by appropriate risk-based premia. However, the approach may lead to Principal-
Agent problems: first, regional governments could use their informational advantage and lie
to the central government about their risks. Second, they may have an incentive to underprice
their coverage, in order to gain from the redistributive scheme at the expense of the other
regions.
Last, there are a number of related problems which were not examined here, such as
the influence of risk mitigation, and the role of bounded rationality in insurance decisions. By
assuming that the government will have in place appropriate land-use and building regulations,
we also ruled out the risk of moral hazard. There could in addition be substantial transaction
costs for a government program that adopted fine-grained risk-based pricing which is updated
over time. These and other questions provide a considerable source of inspiration for future
research.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that insurance-company profit is:
Π(α, p,δ ,c) =
∫ x¯
0
[nα− xnl] f (x)dx− [1−F(x¯)]cn with x¯ = [α+ c]/l.
From the Leibniz rule, the partial derivative with respect to c is:
∂Π
∂c
=
∂ x¯(c)
∂c
[nα− x¯(c)nl] f (x¯(c))− [1−F(x¯(c))]n+ ∂F(x¯(c))
∂c
cn.
Thus,
∂Π
∂c
=
1
l
[nα− x¯nl] f (x¯)− [1−F(x¯)]n+ 1
l
f (x¯)cn =− [1−F(x¯)]n < 0.
From the Leibniz rule, the partial derivative with respect to α is:
∂Π
∂α
=
∂ x¯(α)
∂α
[nα− x¯(α)nl] f (x¯(α))+
∫ x¯(α)
0
n f (x)dx+
∂F(x¯(α))
∂α
cn.
Thus,
∂Π
∂α
=
1
l
[nα− x¯nl] f (x¯)+nF(x¯)+ 1
l
f (x¯)cn = nF(x¯)> 0.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
The scenario with limited liability. Expected utility V can be rewritten as:
V (α, p,δ ,c) =U (−α)−
∫ 1
x¯
[U (−α)−U (−α− l+ I(x))]x f (x)dx with I(x) = c+α
x
.
From the Leibniz rule, the partial derivative with respect to α is:
∂V
∂α
=−U ′ (−α)+ 1
l
[U (−α)−U (−α− l+ I(x¯))] x¯ f (x¯)−
∫ 1
x¯
[
−U ′ (−α)+(1− 1
x
)U ′ (−α− l+ I(x))
]
x f (x)dx.
As x¯ = [α+ c]/l and I(x¯) = c+αx = l, the middle term can be set to 0, which yields:
∂V
∂α
=−U ′ (−α)−
∫ 1
x¯
[
−U ′ (−α)+(1− 1
x
)U ′ (−α− l+ I(x))
]
x f (x)dx.
Consider now a first-order development of U ′, for all x > x¯,
U ′(−α− l+ I(x))≈U ′(−α)+ [−l+ I(x)]U ′′(−α).
Then
(1− x)U ′(−α− l+ I(x))+ xU ′(α)≈U ′(α)+(1− x)[−l+ I(x)]U ′′(−α).
Since [−l+ I(x)] = [I(x)− I(x¯)], we have
∂V
∂α
≈−U ′(−α)+
∫ 1
x¯
U ′(α)+ [(1− x)[I(x)− I(x¯)]U ′′(−α)] f (x)dx,
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with
−U ′(−α)+
∫ 1
x¯
U ′(α) f (x)dx =−U ′(α)
∫ x¯
0
f (x)dx =−U ′(α)×P(X ≤ x¯),
where P(X > x¯) is the probability of insolvency. Moreover,
U ′′(−α)×
∫ 1
x¯
(1− x)[I(x)− I(x¯)] f (x)dx =−U ′′(−α)×H(x¯),
where H(x¯) =
∫ 1
x¯ (1− x)[I(x¯)− I(x)] f (x)dx is a positive function which falls with x¯. Hence ∂V∂α ≤ 0 implies:
−U ′′(−α)×H(x¯)≤U ′(α)×P(X > x¯)⇔ P(X ≤ x¯)
H(x¯)
≥−U
′′(−α)
U ′(α)
,
where
P(X ≤ x¯)
H(x¯)
is a positive increasing function in x¯ and−U ′′(−α)U ′(α) stands for the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative
risk-aversion. If U is convex, this measure is negative, which implies that ∂V/∂α is always negative. When U
is concave, an inflexion point can exist: (1) if x¯ is large (close to 1), then ∂V/∂α is necessarily negative; (2) if x¯
is small, then ∂V/∂α can be positive.
From the Leibniz rule, the partial derivative with respect to c is:
∂V
∂c
=
1
l
[U (−α)−U (−α− l+ I(x¯))] f (x¯)+
∫ 1
x¯
U ′ (−α− l+ I(x¯)) f (x)dx,
i.e., since I(x¯) = l,
∂V
∂c
=
∫ 1
x¯
U ′ (−α− l+ I(x¯)) f (x)dx > 0.
The partial derivative with respect to p is:
∂V
∂ p
=−
∫ 1
x¯
[U (−α)−U (−α− l+ I(x))]x∂ f (x)
∂ p
dx.
which is negative since ∂ f (x)∂ p > 0 for all x¯ > x
∗. Similarly, the partial derivative with respect to δ is:
∂V
∂δ
=−
∫ 1
x¯
[U (−α)−U (−α− l+ I(x))]x∂ f (x)
∂δ
dx,
which is negative since ∂ f (x)∂δ > 0 for all x¯ > x
∗.
The scenario with unlimited guarantee. Expected utility V can be written as:
V (α, p,δ ,c) =
∫ x¯
0
U(−α) f (x)dx+
∫ 1
x¯
U(−α−T (x)) f (x)dx with T (x) = xl−α− c.
From the Leibniz rule, the partial derivative with respect to α is:
∂V
∂α
=
1
l
U (−α) f (x¯)−F(x¯)U ′(−α)− 1
l
U (c− x¯l) f (x¯) =−F(x¯)U ′(−α)< 0.
Expected utility V can also be rewritten as:
V (α, p,δ ,c) =U (−α)−
∫ 1
x¯
[U (−α)−U (−α−T (x))] f (x)dx with T (x) = xl−α− c.
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From the Leibniz rule, the partial derivative with respect to c is:
∂V
∂c
=
1
l
[U (−α)−U (−α−T (x¯))] f (x¯)dx+
∫ 1
x¯
U ′ (−α−T (x)) f (x)dx,
i.e., since T (x¯) = 0,
∂V
∂c
=
∫ 1
x¯
U ′ (−α−T (x)) f (x)dx > 0.
The partial derivative with respect to p is:
∂V
∂ p
=−
∫ 1
x¯
[U (−α)−U (−α−T (x))] ∂ f (x)
∂ p
dx,
which is negative since ∂ f (x)∂ p > 0 for all x¯ > x
∗. The partial derivative with respect to δ is:
∂V
∂δ
=−
∫ 1
x¯
[U (−α)−U (−α−T (x))] ∂ f (x)
∂δ
dx,
which is negative since ∂ f (x)∂δ > 0 for all x¯ > x
∗.
A.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Let V1 = V1(δ1,α) and V2 = V2(δ2,α), with δ1 ≤ δ2. Let V−11 denote the inverse function of V1, with V−11 =
sup{α|V1(α)≥ v}. It is possible to prove that V−11 is decreasing. Indeed, if v′ ≤ v′′ then we have:
{α|V1(α)≥ v′′} ⊂ {α|V1(α)≥ v′} ⇒ sup{α|V1(α)≥ v′′} ≤ {α|V1(α)≥ v′} ⇒ V−11 (v′′)≤V−11 (v′).
From Proposition 2 we know that V1(α)≥V2(α). Since V−11 is a decreasing function, this is equivalent to:
V−11 (V1(α))≤V−11 (V2(α)) ⇔ α ≤V−11 (V2(α)).
The willingness to pay is the premium such that people choose to buy insurance, i.e., V1(α∗1 ) = pU(−l) and
V2(α∗2 ) = pU(−l). Consequently, for α = α∗2 , we have:
α∗2 ≤V−11 (V2(α∗2 )) ⇔ α∗2 ≤V−11 (pU(−l)) ⇔ α∗2 ≤ α∗1 ,
which implies that ∂α
∗
∂δ ≤ 0. Similarly, since ∂V∂c ≥ 0, we can prove that ∂α
∗
∂c ≥ 0.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 4
Denote by α∗lim and α
∗
unlim the willingness to pay under limited liability and unlimited guarantee, respectively.
Let Vlim and Vunlim denote the expected utilities. Since Vunlim is continuous and decreasing, there necessarily
exists a decreasing inverse function V−1unlim. The result that Vunlim is greater than Vlim for any value of α implies:
∀α, Vunlim(α)≥Vlim(α) ⇔ V−1unlim(Vunlim(α))≤V−1unlim(Vlim(α)) ⇔ α ≤V−1unlim(Vlim(α)).
The willingness to pay is the premium such that individuals choose to buy insurance, i.e. Vunlim(α∗ulim) = pu(−l)
and Vlim(α∗unlim) = pu(−l). Consequently, for α = α∗lim, we have:
α∗lim ≤V−1unlim(Vlim(α∗lim)) ⇔ α∗lim ≤V−1unlim(pU(−l)) ⇔ α∗unlim ≤ α∗lim.
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A.5. Proof of Proposition 5
The proofs are similar to that of ∂V/∂δ < 0 in Proposition 2.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 6
For Region i, an increase in α j is similar to a rise in economic capital. The proof that ∂Vi∂α j > 0 is consequently
similar to that of ∂V∂c > 0 in Proposition 2. As a result, the proof that
∂α∗∗i
∂α j
> 0 is equivalent to that of ∂α
∗
∂c > 0
(Proposition 3). Similarly, using Propositions 5 and 3, we can show that ∂α
∗∗
i
∂δi
, ∂α
∗∗
i
∂δ j
and ∂α
∗∗
i
∂θ are negative.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 7
Let Zk be the dichotomous variable which equals 1 when individual k, k = 1..n, makes a claim. The correlation
between risks is given by:
Corr(Zk,Zl) =
Cov(Zk,Zl)
p(1− p) ,
=
P(Zk = 1,Zl = 1)− p2
p(1− p) ,
=
(pC)2 p∗+(pN)2(1− p∗)− p2
p(1− p) .
Replacing pN and pC by Equations 15 and 16 yields the correlation as a function of δ :
Corr(Zk,Zl) =
p
1− p
[
p∗+(1− p∗)(1−δ )
(1−δ −δ p∗)2 −1
]
,
=
p
1− p [g(δ )−1] .
The derivative of g with respect to δ is given by:
dg
dδ
= 2p∗× 2−δ +δ p
∗
1−δ −δ p∗ .
The derivative dgdδ is positive for δ ∈ [0;1], which implies that Corr(Xk,X l) is a positive function of δ . Moreover,
if δ = 0, then pN = pC = p in Equations 15 and 16. In that case, we have P(Zk = 1,Zl = 1) = p2 and
Corr(Zk,Zl) = 0, which corresponds to the independent case. On the other hand, if δ = (1− p)/(1− p∗),
then pN = (p− p∗)/(1− p∗) and pC = 1. In that case, we have P(Zk = 1,Zl = 1) = (p∗(1− p)2)/(1− p∗)+ p2
and Corr(Zk,Zl) = [p∗(1− p)]/[p(1− p∗)], which corresponds to the perfectly-dependent case when p= p∗, i.e.
when P(Zk = 1,Zl = 1) = p and Corr(Zk,Zl) = 1. In other words, the lower is δ the closer are pN and pC to
each other and the more independent are the risks.
A.8. Remarks on the externality condition
Let σ represent the standard deviation of individual losses in a portfolio. When insurance contracts are
independently and identically distributed, the standard deviation of the average loss σ
√
n/n tends toward zero
as the number of policies in the portfolio tends toward infinity. As mentioned in Cummins (2006), this induces
a form of increasing returns to scale: the equity capital, or premium rate, required to reach a given insolvency
target falls with the size of the risk pool. This phenomenon can be seen as the result of positive externalities in
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consumption. Ceteris paribus, as the size of the portfolio increases, the probability of insolvency falls and each
agent enjoys higher expected utility.
We can reach similar conclusions with the mixture model of Section 5. To compute the variance of the
total loss (l2 Var(N)), we need to calculate the variance of N. Let Θ ∈ {No Cat,Cat} denote the occurrence of a
natural catastrophe. We have
Var(N) = Var(E[N|Θ])+E[Var(N|Θ)],
where Var(E[N|Θ]) = n2(pC − pN)2 p∗[1− p∗] and E[Var(N|Θ)] = npC[1− pC]p∗+ npN [1− pN ](1− p∗). In
other words, we have√
Var(N)
n
=
√
(pC− pN)2 p∗[1− p∗]+ pC[1− pC]p
∗+ pN [1− pN ](1− p∗)
n
,
which is a decreasing function of n. The result can also be extended to the probability of large events. Conditional
on the occurrence of a natural catastrophe, nX has a binomial distribution:
Pn(X ≤ x|Cat) =
bnxc
∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
piC[1− pC]n−i
We obtain that if x > pC, then
Pn(X ≤ x|Cat)≤ Pn+1(X ≤ x|Cat).
Thus, as in the independent case, the probability that an extreme event occur will fall with n. In our theoretical
model, this is equivalent to assuming that ∂F/∂n > 0 for all x > x∗. The probability of insolvency then falls with
n when x¯ > x∗.
A.9. Strong Nash equilibrium in the one-region model
Following Konishi et al. (1997) and assuming positive externalities, it is possible to show that there is a unique
strong Nash equilibrium in the one-region model which is symmetric. Let T denote the finite set of agents in
the economy, with Card(T ) = n, and let A = {Insure,Don’t} be the set of actions available. Each agent k in T
chooses an alternative ak from the set A. The agents’ choice constitutes a strategy profile a = (a1,a2, . . . ,an).
The expected utility of agent k is written as V k = V k
(
ak,Ω(ak,a)
)
, where Ω(ak,a) represents the set of agents
who choose alternative ak under the strategy profile a.
By a positive externality we mean that if agent k is insured, his/her payoff rises as another agent who
previously chose “Don’t” changes his/her strategy to “Insure”. In contrast to Konishi et al. (1997), we assume
that the externality condition applies only to insurance, i.e., people who are not insured do not benefit from
having an additional member in their group.
Assumption 1 (A Positive Externality from Insurance). For any two agents k,q ∈ T , for any subset of agents
S⊂ T with k ∈ S and q /∈ S, we have{
V k(ak,S)≤V k(ak,S∪{q}) if ak = Insure,
V k(ak,S) =V k(ak,S∪{q}) if ak = Don’t.
Proposition 8. Under Assumption 1, the one-region model has a strong Nash Equilibrium. This is either
(Insure, Insure, . . . , Insure) or (Don’t,Don’t, . . . ,Don’t).
Proof. A strong Nash equilibrium is an equilibrium where no group of individuals would be better off by jointly
switching their alternatives. Consider first the strategy profile (Don’t,Don’t, . . . ,Don’t). If this is a strong Nash
equilibrium, then there is nothing more to be said. Suppose, therefore, that there exists a coalitional deviation
that benefits all deviating players, i.e., there is a coalition S ⊂ T such that V k(insure,S) > V k(Don’t,T ) for all
k ∈ S. By Assumption 1 and since the agents are identical, the switch by a player q∈ T\S to “Insure” will benefit
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agent q and all the agents in S. The repeated use of this argument implies that only (Insure, Insure, . . . , Insure)
can be a strong Nash Equilibrium.
A.10. Strong Nash equilibria in the two-region model
Following Appendix A.9, let Ti denote the finite set of agents in Region i, with Card(Ti) = ni, i = 1,2.
Each agent k in Ti chooses an alternative aki from A = {Insure,Don’t}. A strategy profile is given by
a = (a11,a
2
1, . . . ,a
n1
1 ,a
1
2,a
2
2, . . . ,a
n2
2 ) = (a1,a2). The expected utility function of agent k is written as V
k
i =
V ki
(
aki ,Ωi(aki ,a)
)
, where Ωi(aki ,a) represents the set of agents in Region i who choose alternative aki under
the strategy profile a. We assume that the insurance industry benefits from positive externalities within each
region.
Assumption 2 (A Positive Externality from Insurance within each Region). For any two agents k,q ∈ Ti, for
any subset of agents Si ⊂ Ti with k ∈ Si and q /∈ Si, we have{
V ki (a
k
i ,Si)≤V ki (ak,Si∪{q}) if aki = Insure,
V ki (a
k
i ,Si) =V
k
i (a
k,Si∪{q}) if aki = Don’t.
Proposition 9. Under the externality condition, a strategy profile where agents in the same region do not play
the same action cannot be a strong Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that a = (Don’t,Don’t, . . . ,Don’t) and that there exists a coalitional deviation in Region i that
benefits all deviating players, that is there exists Si ⊂ Ti such that V ki (Insure,Si) > V ki (Don’t,Ti) for all k ∈ Si.
By Assumption 2, and since the agents are identical, the switch by player q ∈ Ti\Si to “Insure” will benefit agent
q and all the agents in Si. The repeated use of this argument implies that all players in Ti will be better off by
choosing “Insure”.
Assume now that ai = (Insure, Insure, . . . , Insure) and aj = (Don’t,Don’t, . . . ,Don’t). Using the previous
argument, if there exists a deviation in Region j that benefits all deviating players, then all players in Tj will be
better off by choosing “Insure”.
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